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  Michael Ranta
Abstract
In traditional art history, iconological attempts to analyze visual works of art by
treating their formal and semantic features as symptoms of more general,
implied world views or cultures have occurred rather frequently. Still, such
attempts have been criticized for permitting subjective and and non-verifiable
interpretations. In this paper, however, I will argue that (i) pictorial works of art
indeed imply wider world views or schemata, and (ii) that our comprehension of
these schemata can be explained by taking into account recent research within
cognitive psychology. More specifically, I will argue that intelligence partly
consists of the storage and retrieval of action scripts or schemata which may
occur on various levels of abstraction. I will claim that the possession of highlevel narrative structures, shared by a relatively large group of beholders, is
actually a necessary presupposition for understanding pictorial works of art as
part of a wider context, that is, as implying world views.
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1. Introduction

Webmaster

In the humanities, narratology has become a growing field of interest during the
last few decades, most notably among literary analysts, linguists and
semioticians.[1] Quite frequently, narration has been associated with verbal
discourses, whether in written or oral form, where, briefly put, events or
situations are represented in time sequences. Accordingly, theoretical
discussions concerning narrativity have usually focused upon literature and
drama, though also on cinema films and television. However, the ability of
static pictures to represent actions and to narrate stories seems to have
received much less attention in art theory contexts.
Among art historians, on the other hand, the narrative aspects of visual art
have, of course, constituted a prevalent focus of interest, though chiefly from a
descriptive, interpretative and historical point of view. Still, attempts to
elucidate any deeper psychological and philosophical aspects involved in visual
narrativity have usually occurred on a rather superficial level, consisting of
scattered remarks, intuitively based hypotheses, or the like. Any continuous and
systematic treatment of narrative and temporal imagery, compared to the vast
amount of discussions concerning, e.g., the rendering of space and perspective,
seems to have been largely absent.[2]
Now, I have outlined elsewhere how, and by what means, static visual
representations, such as paintings, sculptures, photographs, etc., are capable of
rendering narrative and temporally extended themes and, moreover, by taking
some proposals from especially cognitive psychology into consideration, that is,
in what way such renderings may correspond to conceivable beholders' preestablished expectations or mental schemata.[3] In the present context,
however, I will turn to the question of whether works of art qua narratives are
just as capable of telling stories as narratives expressed more or less explicitly,
or also implicitly may depict wider fictional or real "worlds" or world views.
Within traditional art history, iconological attempts to analyze visual works of
art by treating their formal and semantic features as symptoms of more
general, implied world views or cultures have frequently occurred. Still, such
attempts have been criticized for permitting subjective and non-verifiable (or
non-falisifiable) interpretations.

In this paper, though, I will argue that (i) pictorial works of art indeed imply
wider world views or schemata, and (ii) that our comprehension of these
schemata can be explained by taking recent research within cognitive
psychology into account. More specifically, I will argue (influenced by, e.g., the
work of Roger Schank) that intelligence basically consists in the storage and
retrieval of action scripts or schemata which may occur on various levels of
abstraction.[4] The possession of high-level narrative structures, shared by a
relatively large group of beholders is, I will claim, actually correlated with our
comprehension of pictorial works of art as such, but also imply world views.
2. Iconology and World Views
Within traditional art history, the Warburg School, and most notably Erwin
Panofsky, have held considerable influence by introducing and elaborating the
so-called iconographical or iconological methods. According to Panofsky, a
fruitful investigation of works of art should strive primarily for an analysis of
their meaning-aspects in contradistinction to their formal aspects. Such an
analysis or interpretation can, and should, take several meaning levels into
consideration.[5] First, we have a pre-iconographic level: the depiction of
human beings, animals, natural or artificial objects, etc., the recognition of
which should be as straightforward as possible without necessitating advanced
or specialized knowledge. The identification of gestures, expressive qualities
and simple actions also belong to this level. A second interpretative level, the
iconographical analysis, consists of identifying the subject matter or the theme
of the art work. An iconographical interpretation would demand an identification
of the depicted agents as certain persons, for example the Virgin Mary or
Heracles, or as personifications of abstract concepts such as justice or prudence,
having certain attributes, and would, if necessary, contain some reference to
relevant myths or tales (i.e., complex action sequences). This level, then,
requires acquaintance with relevant literary texts, symbolic dictionaries, and/or
certain oral traditions, as well as general knowledge of a history of visual types
(i.e., the manner in which themes and concepts have been visualized) as a
controlling principle. Finally, a third iconological type of interpretation would
treat the art work as symptomatic of a cultural climate or world view and would
formulate statements suggested by the work in this respect.
According to Panofsky, this meaning level is "apprehended by ascertaining those
underlying principles which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a
class, a religious or philosophical persuasion . . . unconsciously qualified by one
personality and condensed into one work. . .[T]hese principles are manifested
by. . .both 'compositional methods' and 'iconographical significance.'"[6] A
means or, as Panofsky puts it, equipment for interpretation on this level is
termed "synthetic intuition," i.e., "a mental faculty comparable to that of a
diagnostician" including "familiarity with the essential tendencies of the human
mind."[7] Thus the interpreter needs, apart from attempting to take all kinds of
sources into account, some kind of intuitive sensibility and open-mindedness in
order to understand the art work in question as a symptom indicating a broader
world view.
Now, although this iconological approach towards works of art is well-known
and prominent among art historians, it has not been accepted unanimously but
has been criticized for a number of reasons. First, it is sometimes claimed that
iconology as a method gives, in general, a one-sided account and evaluation of
art works because of its tendency to reduce them to something like verbal
messages, thereby neglecting their formal qualities.[8] On the other hand,
numerous examples could be mentioned where Panofsky himself, in concrete
analyses of art works, has given considerable attention to their formal
manifestation. Moreover, the first pre-iconographical level could perhaps been
regarded, at least partly, as an attempt to describe the formal representation of
objects qua "configurations of line and colour" apart from any meaning
aspects.[9] Second, with regard to the iconological level in particular, it may be

asked in which way claims regarding the occurrence of any underlying
principles, constituting or revealing a world view manifested in a work of art,
are verifiable or falsifiable. How should we distinguish "deep-interpretations"
supported by iconographic or other kinds of evidence from mere speculations,
not least due to the fact that a world view is supposed to be "unconsciously
qualified by one personality, and condensed into one work"? Panofsky was, not
surprisingly, aware of such obstacles:
There is. . .admittedly some danger that iconology will behave. .
.like astrology to astrography. . .There is, I am afraid,. . .no other
answer to this problem than the use of historical methods
tempered, if possible, by common sense. We have to ask ourselves
whether or not the symbolical significance of a given motif is a
matter of established representational tradition;. . .whether or not
a symbolical interpretation can be justified by definite texts or
agrees with ideas demonstrably alive in the period and presumably
familiar to its artists;. . .and to what extent such a symbolical
interpretation is in keeping with the historical position and personal
tendencies of the individual master.[10]
Third, the relationship between philosophical doctrines, more general world
views, and their artistic manifestation is not always very precise. Iconological
research in general, not only in Panofsky's case, has sometimes tended to
abstract specific philosophical doctrines (e.g., Neoplatonic thought in
Renaissance art) from works of art; still, a broader world view cannot be
reduced to a particular philosophy. Rather, philosophical ideas may contribute
to or articulate world views but they cannot be identified with the latter.
Panofsky himself seemed to draw a distinction between philosophy and world
views, and both art as well as philosophy may express or indicate broader world
views, thus to some extent being parallel products.[11]
3. Ingredients of World Views
The world view concept (and its cognates) is, however, not very precise and can
be used in several senses. Thus, it can not only overlap with, or result in,
specific philosophical doctrines but also religious, epistemic, political, moral or
otherwise ideological convictions, interests and desires, as well as patterns of
behavior. Moreover, the term is not only applied to groups of persons as well as
periods and epochs but sometimes also to certain individuals.[12] Now,
generally speaking, a world view may perhaps be outlined as a "way of looking
at reality, [which] . . .consists of basic assumptions and images [i.e. mental
representations] that provide a more or less coherent, though not necessarily
accurate, way of thinking about the world."[13] Although world views differ in
their way of representing reality due to cross-cultural and more or less
idiosyncratic differences, it seems quite problematic to assume that there are
no interculturally stable constraints on their formation.
During the last few decades, the view that no theory-neutral observations are
achievable has gained relatively wide acceptance among philosophers of science
and epistemology as well as other scholars within the human sciences. In its
most radical versions, this view has led to various forms of cognitive relativism,
that is, the view that beliefs and assertions (based upon observations) cannot
be justifiable or true in any neutral sense, but unavoidably have to be judged so
in relation to certain theoretical, historical, sociological, cultural or even
subjective presuppositions - or, put in another way, world views.[14]
However, although we might allow for a certain plasticity and even unreliability
in our observations, this does not necessarily mean that "anything goes." There
may be significant constraints on people's perception of objects and visual
patterns, and in that case observation is not entirely theory or concept-bound.
At least the empirical evidence, which sometimes has been used in support of
perceptual relativism, is highly problematic or insufficient. On the contrary,

recent research into visual perception within, for example, neurophysiology and
cognitive science seems to suggest that there is indeed a remarkable, crosscultural stability, at least in terms of some basic aspects of feature, object and
pattern recognition.[15]
Now, in order to make any cross-cultural comparisons of world views possible,
it seems necessary to establish at least a minimal set of general characteristics
of any world view. As suggested by the anthropologist Michael Kerney, there are
at least four aspects or "diagnostic categories" which should be taken into
consideration.[16]
(i) First, a necessary requirement for something to be a world view is, apart
from a conception of a "cosmic totality" or universe, the awareness and
distinction between the Self and the Other, that is, the surrounding environment
as well as other individuals. The locus of the Self may be coextensive with the
individual's body, but this does not necessarily have to be the case; in certain
cultures, some vital aspects of the Self are considered to exist outside the
physical body. Moreover, the relationship between Self and Other may vary and,
for example, be experienced as being intimately interdependent, passive and
more or less harmonious, such as occurs in numerous tribal societies. In other
cases, however, this relationship is characterized by a stronger emphasis on
individualism and personal activity, where the Other is conceived of as a
potential threat or as existing in order to be manipulated or exploited. Especially
during the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and in modern Western society, such
a tendency has been prevalent.[17]
(ii) Second, world views can be characterized by their ways of categorizing
reality. The process of classification, that is, naming objects and conceptually
subsuming them under larger more general groupings, appears to be a
universal phenomenon in all societies, although, of course, a wide variety of
classification schemes exists. On a fundamental level, this seems especially to
be the case regarding two contrasting classificatory distinctions, namely what
should count as "real" or "unreal" and "natural" or "supernatural,"
respectively.[18] However, category formation appears, sometimes to a
remarkable extent, to hold across a diversity of cultural environments, since the
features of the category members in question are similarly perceived among
various categorizers. Although it is obvious that the world in principle may be
structured in an infinite number of different ways, several psychologists and
anthropologists have nevertheless stressed the significance of structures
inherent in the environment for category formation. While acknowledging
possible higher-level influences on classification, such as linguistic, cultural or
cognitive presuppositions, they still assume that evolutionary processes, in
combination with environmental features, have had a major constraining impact
on how categories are formed.[19]
The non-arbitrariness and relative stability of certain categories seems also to
have been confirmed by cross-cultural studies from anthropological research
where classification in a variety of cultures and language communities has been
studied. Interestingly, the categorization of household objects, kinship, color,
and especially plants and animals among different cultures is not always as
diverse as one might expect. The anthropologist Barbara Malt, for example,
maintains in a detailed discussion and comparison of psychological and
anthropological investigations into classification that at least some biological
categories are recognized as such with remarkable cross-cultural regularity.
There is no doubt, she admits, that utilitarian, mythical or symbolic
considerations and varying degrees of expertise or knowledge may influence the
formation of categories. For example, top-down, constructive processes play an
important role in this respect. However, numerous findings suggest that "some
categories are salient to all observers," and that "[s]trong clusters of features
exist in the world, and the human categorizer need only apply basic perceptual
processes to extract these feature clusters and form categories."[20] Apart

from a possible "substantial contribution of a structured environment,"[21]
these constraints may possibly be explained by the fact that human beings
share some general capacities, such as ease of perception, motor movement,
memory, learning, and so on.[22]
(iii) Third, a basic feature of any world view appears to be the notion of
causality, that is, the relationship between acts or causes and their (desired)
ends or effects. Although the very concept of causality seems to be a crossculturally universal phenomenon, its concrete manifestations may of course vary
considerably. For example, in societies or individuals with a relatively weak
distinction between the Self and the Other, it is more likely that personal
thoughts and feelings are attributed to the external world, such as will and
volition as causes of events such as weather conditions or accidents. Moreover,
any presupposed distinction between real/unreal or natural/supernatural may
influence causal attributions or beliefs, resulting, for example, in astrological,
religious or magical beliefs.[23] However, from an evolutionary point of view, it
seems also reasonable to assume that there are valid cross-cultural constraints
concerning people's beliefs in causal relations, having to do with basic needs for
food, protection/health, sexual reproduction, and the like.
(iv) Fourth, Kearney suggests that the notions of Space and Time might also be
considered to be basic characteristics of world-views. Linguistically speaking, all
known languages express a concern with directions and locations, such as up,
at, down, forward, backward, north, south, and so on. The perception of space,
however, may vary due to environmental or other influences. For example, a
Pygmy, who has spent all of his/her life in the forest where one cannot see for
great distances because of the denseness of the vegetation, may perceive
objects outside the forest in a considerably different way from people
acquainted with expansive areas. From the perspective of such a person, large
animals several miles away on a savannah may be mistaken for insects.[24]
According to numerous psychological findings, human beings seem to be able to
abstract spatial relationships apart from sensory knowledge, that is, create and
store mental representations and maps of spatial features.
Moreover, all languages are capable of articulating temporal relations in a rather
abstract way. According to Kearney, the very existence of nouns indicate an
awareness of the constancy and continuity of objects or states of affairs, while
verbs entail actions or processes. In both cases temporal aspects are involved.
Furthermore, it seems that various cultures put emphasis on one area of time
rather than the other two (i.e., the past, the present, or the future). A future
orientation seems to be predominant in Jewish, Christian and modern Western
societies. Perhaps most notable in this respect are societies influenced by
Calvinist thinking with their underlying theory of predestination: the doctrine
that God has decreed from eternity that part of mankind shall have eternal life
and part eternal punishment, which our success, or lack of success, in this life is
indicative of. In many Latin American and Mediterranean societies, however, the
future is apparently seen as quite uncertain and unreal; there the temporal
focus seems to lie in the present. A strong orientation to the past appears to
have been manifested in traditional Chinese culture, as well as in Mormon
societies, the latter being concerned with the historical past of their religion and
genealogy, i.e. their family trees.[25]
Apart from such varying orientations to specific areas of time, there also seem
to be different ways of looking at the process of time. In relatively simple,
preliterate societies, without any tradition of historiography, a tendency toward
an oscillating image of time appears to be prevalent.[26] This means that time
is regarded as something with a zig-zag rhythm, swinging back and forth
between recurrent events or states of affairs, such as night and day, the
seasons, drought and flood, life and death or the succession of generations,
certain festivals and ceremonies, and so on. On a broader level it is, of course,
also conceivable to think of the emergence, rise and fall of entire civilizations or

societies in a similar way. A linear image of time, however, considers time to be
unidirectional and irreversible. Indicative of such a view is obviously the
grammar of numerous Indo-European languages, where verbs in every
sentence have to be expressed in a tense, such as past, present or future,
which is not the case in all languages. This time-image has been predominant in
ancient Hebrew and Christian societies but perhaps most notably in modern
Western societies with an especially well-developed historiography. Quite
obviously, a linear view of time appears to be correlated or at least compatible
with a future orientation of time. It should be noted further that oscillating and
linear time images do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive; both views
seem to have been common in all societies, depending on the context. Thus we
probably should conceive of them as a matter of prevalence or degree rather
than a matter of kind.[27]
4. Western Art History and World Views
Let us look at some examples illustrating how Kearney's proposal concerning
some minimal requirements for world views might be applicable to works of art.
In the present context, I intend to focus upon instances of Western art, which is
unfortunate. Kearney's suggestions may well be relevant for the analysis and
comprehension of non-Western art, such as Japanese scroll painting, Chinese
landscape painting, Mayan reliefs, and so forth. However, any attempt to
incorporate here such a variety of pictorial representations from different
cultures and historical periods would be time-consuming and demand extensive
space. Thus I will have to leave it to the reader to add possible non-Western
examples to the following historical outline. Moreover, the Western hemisphere
shows remarkable cultural diversity, which seems to be sufficient enough for a
preliminary discussion of conceptions and varieties of world views related to
pictorial art.
In ancient Egypt, especially, an oscillating image of time seems to have had a
comparable impact. Nature's recurring changes - day and night, the seasons,
the moon cycles, the annual flood of the Nile and, not the least, life and death influenced the Egyptian view of temporality deeply and was reflected in rituals
and feasts, as well as the political system. (A new temporal cycle started with
every pharaoh.) In art, Egyptians were less concerned with rendering man's
temporal and transitory affairs rather than the eternal present. As a
consequence, it appears, pictorial art is highly schematized and static. There is
no illusion of space or depth and hardly any depictions of particular objects or
persons with individualized features. Instead, to a considerable extent pictures
contain symbolic elements and depict types rather than particulars. Their
categorization of objects (humans vs. animals, animate vs. inanimate, women
vs. men) is compatible with our present way of classification, and thus
comprehensible. Still, the distinction between natural-supernatural seems to
deviate from our present standards. Implicitly rendered principles of causality
are to some extent intelligible.

Illustration 1: Tomb of Ti, Saqqara, c. 2450 BC.

Illustration 1 shows clearly a group of men driving a flock of sheep forward;
undoubtedly, it would be absurd to claim that the sheep are driving the men
backwards (which in that case would be seen as defending themselves with
whips)[28]
Also, in archaic Greek art (c. 700-480 B.C.), a striving for the eternal and stable
aspects of reality seems to have been prevalent. So-called kouroi, funerary or
votive statues, perhaps commemorating men who had died in early age and
were believed to have a further continuing existence as heroes, are quite
obviously not portraits of individuals, despite the fact that some have name
inscriptions in their bases.

Illustration 2: Kleobis and Briton, c. 580 BC.[29]

The facial expressions and bodily poses are strongly conventionalized and static;
their archaic smile is hardly supposed to be indicative of a transitory emotional
expression but rather of the presence of a soul. During the Classical period (c.
480-323 B.C.), however, another kind of self-awareness and image of time
seems to have developed. Some of the first experiments in perspective (e.g.,
the apparent diminution of objects in proportion to their greater distance from
the beholder) appear and interest increases in creating broader spatial
environments in which individual characters can move, interact and show
emotional or moral reactions.

Illustration 3: Frieze from temple of Apollon Epikouris, Bassai, c. 410 BC.[30]

Generally speaking, a previously unknown belief in the self as relatively
autonomous from the environment (perhaps most concisely expressed in
Protagoras' doctrine "Man is the measure of all things") arose. During the fifth
century B.C., this strengthened anthropocentrism led to the conviction that
human progress is possible, a cultural evolution made possible with the help of
technē, i.e., the orderly application of knowledge for the purpose of producing a
specific, predetermined product.[31] Accordingly, such a future orientation
toward time also seems to have been manifested in pictorial works of art.
Despite these anthropocentric tendencies, the group experience and the
community's values were still given priority. Rather, it is from the fourth century
onwards that a stronger emphasis was put on the personal experience and the
human existence, including emotion, imagination, will, perception and thought,
as a conscious and relatively independent whole.[32]
Roman portrait busts from the Republican era show an even more unmistakable
interest in individuality. With regard to the physiognomic features of the
represented persons, strikingly realistic.

Illustration 4: Patrician carrying two portraits of ancestors, c. AD 15.[33]

This genre had its roots in a tradition of ancestor worship, beginning with the
production of wax masks of deceased relatives, and later on using more durable
material such as marble. Actually, genealogical lines of descent were drawn to
form family trees, making use of portraits and written documents that were
stored in aristocratic family archive rooms. Apparently, this tradition implies
continuity between the individual and family, as well as a linear image of time,
though rather orientated towards the past and the present than the future.

Pictures with an outspoken narrative function with temporal ingredients have of
course occurred throughout history.[34] First, we have numerous historical
examples where static, monoscenic and quite distinct pictures are linked in
narrative series having a fixed reading order. Modern instances of this kind of
pictorial narration can be found in strip cartoons, but do actually occur as early
as in antiquity and the Middle Ages. For example, Giotto's frescoes in the Arena
Chapel (Padua, Italy), c. 1306, have a distinct reading order that implies a
linear time image stretching from the past (Virgin Mary's prehistory, the Passion
scenes) to the future (the Last Judgment). The present is also emphasized by
means of naturalistic representations of vices and virtues in grisaille, seemingly
being inside painted niches, that reminded contemporary beholders of their own
lives at that time and the future consequences in terms of punishment or reward
during the Last Judgment.

Illustration 5.[35]

Second, and often discussed by art historians, there are also single pictures
showing different events and persons in the same pictorial space. In these
cases, sometimes called "continuous narratives" or cases of "simultaneous
succession," various phases in an event series are represented
simultaneously.[36] Such forms of pictorial narration, sometimes intertwined
with linear narrative renderings, can also be found throughout history. For
instance, the epic-documentary representation on the column of Trajan of the
emperor's war against the Dacians (c. 101-106 AD), shows a linear succession
of events, though in an apparently continuous picture-space, with the emperor
appearing numerous times.

The rendering of space in pictorial art has been one of the most well-discussed
topics in art history during the last century, and, in concluding this sketch
regarding apparent manifestations of world views in pictorial art, some short
remarks concerning spatial relations should be sufficient. While historically
spatial depth has been indicated quite early by means of the diminution of
objects, foreshortenings, and the like, a coherent and unitary rendering of space
did not occur before the Renaissance, with its introduction of linear perspective
and clearly defined vanishing points. According to Panofsky, in his well-known
essay "Die Perspektive als 'symbolische Form" (1927), perspective during the
Renaissance is seemingly a neutral and geometrically correct reproduction of
our visual field, a claim, however, that for several reasons can be put into
question.[37] Fundamentally, we should regard perspective as a symbolic form,
indicative of a tendency to create a distance between "I" and "not-I," between
subject and object,between the Self and the Other. There is an ambiguity in
perspective. On one hand, it can be interpreted as the "mathematization" and
objective ordering of space, while on the other hand it also puts emphasis on
the beholder's individual point of view, his or her personal stance, separated
from the world. Thus, linear perspective should be seen as expressive of the
creative interdependence between the mind and the world, between the
artist/beholder and nature. A thorough discussion of Panofsky's comments on
space as revealing world views in this and numerous further texts would
probably be fruitful, but unfortunately go beyond the questions at issue in this
paper.
5. Cognitive Psychology and Schema Theory
After having suggested some minimal, though probably not exhaustive,
requirements for, or constituents of, world views and their apparent
manifestation in works of art, let us turn to the question of how and in what
way research within cognitive psychology might help us to elucidate this notion
and, furthermore, shed some light on the iconological aspects of art works.
Now, during the last decades cognitive psychologists have given considerable
attention to the capacity of humans and other living creatures to categorize
objects and events. It seems unquestionable that this capacity is essential for
organisms to survive and to improve their living conditions. The formation of
categories enables us to apply previous experiences to new ones, to make
inferences, and to make predictions about the future; they provide efficiency in
communication.. Important questions, however, are how do categories arise at
all (i.e., whether, or to what extent, they are the result of environmental
features or constructive processes on the part of the categorizer), and how are
they represented in consciousness? A major tenet in cognitive psychology is the
assumption that the mind should be regarded as a symbol-processing system,
and that one important goal is to identify and explain the representations and
symbolic processes involved in cognitive activities. A significant characteristic of
cognitive psychology, which clearly distinguishes it from traditional
behaviourism, is thus the supposition that intelligent organisms are capable of
constructing and manipulating mental representations.
A number of cognitive psychologists have argued that perception and cognitive
activities are hierarchically structured. New information is compared with and
assimilated into broader schemata or categories that are necessary for object
recognition, explanations, predictions and communicative activities. Put in
another way, humans seem to be able to store mental representations which
have something like a type-character. These representations are thus some
kind of abstraction, stored in long-term memory, with which external objects
are compared. Common taxonomic categories are acquired after encountering
several particular instances of the category in question, after which relevant
characteristics are extracted and integrated into category knowledge.
Numerous studies within cognitive psychology indicate that category formation
in general, whether we think of categories such as furniture, fruit, birds,

animals, and so on, may be explained as outlined here. It should also be
emphasized that these studies are empirically based, making use of
sophisticated and rigorous experimental and statistical methods, thus giving the
hypotheses put forward,I believe, additional strength compared to pure
philosophical reflections.[38]
Research within cognitive psychology suggests that not only objects but also
events may be regarded as belonging to more general categories, i.e., action
schemas. For example, events such as buying a ticket or wearing a dark dress
may belong to categories such as going to the cinema or going to a funeral,
which may be further categorized as instances of an entertainment event, or an
occasion for grief. Sequences of such stereotypical and categorizable actions are
commonly called "frames," "scripts" or "event schemas" in cognitive
psychology.[39] These schemas thus incorporate generalized knowledge about
event sequences, e.g., the order in which specific events will take place; causal,
enabling, or conventionalized relations between these events; and what kind of
events occur at all in certain action sequences. Moreover, there are also scene
schemas that are characterized by spatial rather than temporal relations. For
example, we have certain expectations as to how the rooms, streets and
buildings look like where particular activities, such as going to a restaurant or
going to a funeral, take place. Hence we have mentally stored inventory
information, i.e., what kinds of objects normally appear in such situations, as
well as spatial-relation information,. concerning the usual spatial layout of a
scene.[40]
A number of experimental studies have been carried out in order to investigate
the formation and structure of such action schemas or scripts. It has been
proposed that, to a considerable extent, our knowledge is organized around a
large amount of stereotypic situations consisting of more or less routine
activities.[41] Through previous direct or indirect experiences, we acquire
hundreds of such cultural stereotypes, along with idiosyncratic variations.
Moreover, such memory structures may occur on various levels of abstraction.
In the lower levels there will be scenes: general structures that describe how
and when a particular set of actions will take place, such as a doctor's waiting
room scene, reception scene or surgery scene. Each scene defines a setting, a
goal and actions in attempting to reach a specific goal. Scenes can point to
scripts, which provide the details concerning stereotyped actions that take place
within a scene. They are then organized into wider "memory organization
packages" (MOPs) which are directed towards the achievement of a major goal.
Several MOPs may be active at one time and may reflect the physical, social and
personal aspects of a certain activity. Moreover, MOPs may be more or less
idiosyncratic, culturally specific or even universal. Some goal-derived categories
seem to be relatively stable when it comes to between-subject, as well as to
within-subject agreement. As experimental findings obtained by Lawrence
Barsalou and his colleagues have revealed, typicality ratings of members of
goal-derived categories are sometimes roughly as stable as those of common
taxonomic categories. In several cases, including rather bizarre ones such as
ways to escape being killed by the Mafia, goal-related categories have shown to
exhibit prototype structures quite similar to those in common taxonomic
ones.[42] Although people have never encountered or memorized members of
such categories before, thus apparently lacking any basis for judging some of
them as more typical than others, it is not the case that they are regarded as
equivalent. In the last example mentioned, it may be admitted that moving to
South America would be more efficient or even optimal for achieving the
relevant goal than moving to Copenhagen, if one lives in Stockholm. However,
in both cases one is basically assuming that maximizing the geographic distance
between oneself and the Mafia (or any conceivable threat!) should optimize the
chance of goal-success. Such a category member would thus have something
like a prototypical status within the category in question, with a relatively high
degree of intersubjective agreement. According to Barsalou, this stability may at
least partly be accounted for by taking underlying causal principles into

consideration:
...[T]he causal principles that bear on goal achievement may often
provide strong and salient constraints on the properties that can
represent goal-derived categories. For example, causal principles
relevant to human interactions specify that geographic distance is
a relevant property for ways to escape being killed by the Mafia.
Even though a given goal-derived category may only occur to a
few people on a few occasions, the causal principles that constrain
it may be obvious and well known, such that different people
construct similar representations."[43]
Now, it is hardly controversial to suspect, I believe, that the identity of cultures,
and sub-cultures, of course, is based upon the sharing of such low- and highlevel narrative structures to a considerable extent, or, as we might say, of more
or less specific constituents of world views. And, as the cognitive psychologist
Roger Schank has claimed, the sharing of certain stories actually defines a
culture or subculture, although their members often are unaware of such stories'
existence; they are rather tacitly taken for granted and appear in highly
abbreviated form.
With regard to pictorial art, we can assume that in numerous cases the
rendered content more or less corresponds to and may be assimilated by
narrative mental representations that are shared by a relatively large group of
beholders. As, for example, the art historian Michael Baxandall convincingly has
claimed, artists have usually adapted their work to the general cognitive
demands and presuppositions of the intended beholders.[44] Although
Baxandall has focused chiefly on strategies for pictorial representation used in
fifteenth-century Italian painting, it seems quite possible to take his account as
suggesting a more general point. The production of visual works of art is
influenced by the demands and needs of a certain public. The artist responds to
these demands and offers opportunities for the beholder to apply the
background experience of his or her way of life (in this case, including the
knowledge of biblical stories) as well as artistic conventions. The beholder
interprets a work of art according to acquired category systems and habits that
the work has been adapted to. The recognition of familiar items or themes and
the experience of something as typical, in some sense, may give the beholder a
feeling of satisfaction. With regard to the historical context discussed by
Baxandall, such recognizable (and enjoyable) motifs may be typical religious
events, typical geometric forms or mathematical relationships and typical dance
formations.
The presuppositions on the part of the beholders may, of course, vary
considerably among different individuals. An important task of artists, however,
appears to be the ability to abstract and visualize those types of subjects that
can be recognized and appreciated by a larger public; that is, subjects that
provide some kind of common denominators among individual beholders' mental
representations. Such visual renderings may be regarded as more or less typical
by the intended beholder. Pictorial narration, I believe, is frequently based upon
the existence and activation of such mentally stored action and scene schemas
on the part of the beholders. These mental schemas are usually constituted out
of earlier experiences of action series and events, either due to the beholders'
previously acquired, direct familiarity with them, or due to the beholders'
acquaintance with written, oral and pictorial descriptions of certain events (e.g.,
religious or mythological tales). Pictorial narration, we may assume, consists of
representing more or less significant components of action sequences familiar to
the beholders, sometimes only by rendering a specific, arrested moment that
can activate a wider, mentally imagined event schema. Moreover, narrative and
temporal aspects in pictorial representations may also occur in implicit
renderings of nature's and the seasons' cyclic processes, of human's
ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, of cultural and historic situations as

related to other contexts or even the present (i.e., the context in which the
picture has been created), and so on.
Thus, as I claim, ingredients of world views, on a more or less general level, are
undoubtedly at least implicitly expressed in pictorial art. A picture says indeed
more than a thousand words; the explicitly rendered content of a painting is
usually spontaneously filled out with assumptions that are tacitly taken for
granted on part of the artist and by the intended beholders.[45] Indeed, the
very identification of a picture qua semantically meaningful work presupposes,
to some extent, the sharing of common beliefs and category structures.
Although we have to admit that there are idiosyncratic and cultural variations
with regard to world views, it seems hardly plausible to maintain that there are
no commonly shared underlying structures for understanding the world, and
radical incommensurability claims seem to be highly unconvincing. From such
common denominators, the beholder may, as a second step, infer or suspect
deviations from his or her own world view.
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